

SONKALMUN'26 NATO

Study Guide

Agenda Item:

Increasing defence investment and fairer burden-sharing by Allies, strengthening the Alliance's defence industrial capacity and expanding production lines.

Under-Secretary

General: Taha 'Teyakkuz' Demir



LETTER FROM SECRETARY GENERAL

Dear Delegates

It's my ultimate pleasure to welcome you as the secretary general of the very first edition of ŞÖNKALMUN. We as the ŞÖNKALMUN'26 Team are very thrilled to see our participants in our conference since each and every member of this team showed an extraordinary effort to organize the best potential conference. All our efforts are aimed at providing our participants with an enjoyable time. We can't wait to see the result of our unbelievable effort, sleepless nights, tears and unbelievable team work.

In ŞÖNKALMUN we expect our delegates to speak up, raise their voice for those who can't, examine and carry the problems of the others. This is not just an event. We are aiming to raise awareness about our global problems. The agenda items of this year were selected with great care and attention to detail for give our delegates to opportunity of speak about the problems we need to be worried about. We highly encourage our delegates to defend their ideas and not afraid of express themselves. No matter your country or your role everyone's ideas are important and worth to listen. In events like this it's true that everyone have their own ideas and everyone try to support their ideas but it doesn't mean that they are judging your ideas. MUN is about collaborate with communities and find common solutions. Remember the problems you talk about this committee are real problems in daily life.

In order to achieve the conference's objectives, the delegates' contributions are just as important as our own efforts. This conference will be meaningful when you actively participate, share your ideas, and strive to gain something from the experience. My words are not sufficient to tell you how excited we are to see you in our event. We are planning these 3 days for a long time to give you an unforgettable experience. The friendships we've formed here, the debating skills we've developed, and the diplomatic solutions you've found form the core of these events. Speaking for all the ŞÖNKALMUN team I want to thank all of you for not leaving us alone in our journey.

Best Regards
Asya K kce
Secretary-General

LETTER FROM UNDER-SECRETARY GENERAL

Distinguished Delegates,

It is my distinct honor to welcome you all to this committee. My name is Taha ‘Teyakkuz’ Demir, and I will be serving as your Under-Secretary-General throughout the course of this conference.

We are gathered here to address one of the most complex and rapidly evolving threats of our time: cyber insecurity and its implications on global stability. The agenda before you is not a hypothetical scenario, but a reflection of how fragile and vulnerable our interconnected world has become.

From the detection of anomalies within NATO systems to the widespread disruptions caused by the ‘‘Gap Operation,’’ and ultimately the global انتشار of the ‘‘joke.zip’’ file by the hacker network known as Black Echo, we are witnessing a chain reaction that extends far beyond digital borders. These developments challenge not only state security, but also public trust, economic continuity, and civil liberties.

As delegates, you are expected to think critically, act diplomatically, and respond decisively. The measures taken by certain states, including restrictions on access to information, have sparked significant unrest among populations. This raises a fundamental question that you must confront: how far can security measures go before they begin to undermine the very freedoms they aim to protect?

This committee will require you to go beyond surface-level debate. You must analyze, negotiate, and produce realistic, implementable solutions. Creativity, leadership, and strong diplomacy will define your success here.

I expect active participation, respect for procedure, and a genuine commitment to addressing the agenda at hand. The direction of this committee depends on you.

I wish you all productive debates and a successful conference.

Respectfully,
Taha ‘‘Teyakkuz’’ Demir
Under-Secretary-General

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Introduction of NATO

NATO is a political and military alliance of 32 countries in Europe and North America. It was founded in 1949 with a clear mission: to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members, against all threats, from all directions. NATO was founded in the aftermath of the Second World War to preserve peace and security across Europe and North America. Originally consisting of 12 countries, its membership has increased through several rounds of accession to encompass 32 Allies today. The Alliance's founding principle of collective defence is that an attack against one is considered an attack against all. NATO was created by 12 countries from Europe and North America on 4 April 1949.

Since then, 20 more countries have joined NATO through 10 rounds of enlargement (in 1952, 1955, 1982, 1999, 2004, 2009, 2017, 2020, 2023 and 2024).

Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty sets out how countries can join the Alliance. It states that membership is open to any "European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area".

Any decision to invite a country to join the Alliance is taken by the North Atlantic Council, NATO's principal political decision-making body, on the basis of consensus among all Allies.

Introduction of the Agenda Item

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) plays a crucial role in maintaining collective security and stability among its member states. In recent years, the international security environment has become increasingly complex due to rising geopolitical tensions, regional conflicts, and the emergence of new forms of warfare such as cyber threats and hybrid attacks. These evolving challenges have placed significant pressure on NATO to strengthen its military readiness and ensure that the Alliance remains capable of responding effectively to both current and future threats.

One of the key issues facing NATO today is the need for increased defence investment and fairer burden-sharing among its member states. While NATO operates on the principle of collective defence, not all Allies contribute equally to defence spending and military capabilities. This imbalance has raised concerns about the sustainability and effectiveness of the Alliance's defence commitments. Therefore, increasing defence investment and ensuring that all members contribute fairly has become a major priority for NATO.

In addition to financial contributions, strengthening NATO's defence industrial capacity is also essential. Expanding production lines for military equipment, improving supply chains, and enhancing technological innovation are critical steps in ensuring that NATO forces remain well-equipped and prepared for potential conflicts. By addressing these challenges, NATO aims to reinforce its collective defence capabilities, maintain strategic stability, and uphold its commitment to protecting the security and sovereignty of its member states.

1. Historical Background of NATO

1.1 The Establishment of NATO and the Role of Defense Investments in Collective Security, 1949–1960

With the end of World War II in 1945, the European continent experienced a profound collapse both physically and militarily, strategically. Industrial centers were devastated, transportation networks were shattered, millions of soldiers were demobilized, and the majority of states found themselves unable to sustain their national defense on their own. The fundamental question that emerged in this environment was how security would be ensured in the postwar international system. While the United States, one of the war's victorious powers, rose to a position of global military and economic supremacy, the Soviet Union, rapidly expanding its influence in Eastern Europe, began to be perceived as a direct and constant threat to Western Europe. The Soviet military presence in Eastern Europe, the establishment of communist regimes across a region stretching from Poland to Czechoslovakia, and fears of ideological expansion led Western European states to the conclusion that security could no longer be ensured through national efforts alone.

During this period, most Western European countries possessed neither the manpower nor the defense industrial infrastructure to stand up to a military power such as the Soviet Union. The devastating effects of the war had severely limited defense production capacity, resulting in significant shortfalls in ammunition, armored vehicles, and air power. This situation made it imperative to address security within a collective rather than an individual framework. The Dunkirk Agreement signed between the United Kingdom and France in 1947 and the Western Union established in 1948 with the participation of Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg were the first examples of efforts to establish a Europe-centered defense system. However, these initiatives were deemed insufficient to counter the Soviet threat without the military power and economic support of the United States.

At this point, the United States approach to European security has become decisive. The Washington administration assessed that instability in Europe directly threatened United States national security and argued that security must be based not only on military but also on economic foundations. By supporting Europe's economic reconstruction through the Marshall Plan, the United States has clearly demonstrated that defense investments must be an integral part of this reconstruction. The revitalization of the defense industry, the strengthening of military infrastructure, and the continuity of production lines were viewed as fundamental elements of security during this period.

Based on this principle, NATO was established on April 4, 1949. The founding members who signed the Washington Treaty included the United States and Canada, as well as the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy, Portugal, Norway, Denmark, and Iceland. **Article 5, the most critical provision of the Treaty, established the principle of collective defense on a legal foundation by stipulating that an armed attack against one member would be considered an attack against all members.** However, this article was not merely a political declaration of solidarity but also constituted a commitment requiring prior defense investments. After all, collective defense only gains meaning through ready forces, operational bases, sufficient ammunition stocks, and a sustainable defense industry. This situation implies that member countries must continuously support NATO.

In the early years of NATO's establishment, defense investments were regarded as the alliance's unseen yet most vital component. Member states were expected not only to provide military units but also to construct airports, ports, and headquarters; to rebuild defense industry facilities; and to establish the infrastructure necessary for uninterrupted production in the event of a war. During this period, the United States became the primary financier and military power of European defense; it established military bases on European soil and deployed nuclear and conventional weapons systems. In return, European countries contributed to the alliance with their ground forces, logistical infrastructure, and production capacity. The resulting structure was an asymmetric yet mutually dependent defense model. However, although the perception of a Soviet threat was a largely shared concern among members in NATO's early years, some differences of opinion emerged in the early period regarding the scale and distribution of defense investments. While the United States shouldered a significant portion of defense expenditures and the military burden, criticisms were raised that some European countries provided more limited contributions, citing economic difficulties as a justification. Beginning in the early 1950s, the question of how long American taxpayers would finance European security began to be openly debated in the United States Congress. These debates signaled the first signs of the "fair burden-sharing" issue that would frequently arise within NATO in the coming decades.

In NATO's founding philosophy, the assumption that a potential war would not be short-lived has played a significant role. For this reason, the defense industry has been planned to maintain uninterrupted production not only during peacetime but also under wartime conditions. Ammunition stocks have been maintained at levels sufficient to sustain a conflict lasting months or even years; production lines have been structured according to long-term mobilization scenarios. In this context, the defense industry has been viewed not merely as a military tool but also as a political and strategic power element. When the 1945–1960 period is evaluated as a whole, it becomes clear that NATO was not merely an alliance composed of military forces but a security architecture built upon shared defense investment and industrial capacity. It was clearly understood during this early period that collective defense was impossible without defense expenditures, production infrastructure, and long-term planning. Consequently, the issues of defense investment and burden-sharing currently debated within NATO are not temporary or specific to current crises, but rather a continuation of structural problems that have existed since the alliance's inception.

1.2 High Defense Expenditures and Industrial Mobilization during the Cold War, 1960–1991

Starting in the mid-1950s, the question of not only the scale of defense investments within NATO but also who would make these investments, to what extent, and in which areas became an increasingly prominent topic of debate. Although the perception of a common threat was quite clear at the Alliance's founding, the issue of which ally would bear what share of the costs in response to this threat gradually evolved into a source of political, economic, and even social tension. Particularly during this period as the Cold War intensified, the sustainability of defense spending was viewed as a fundamental element of NATO's deterrence; however, serious disagreements emerged within the Alliance regarding the fair distribution of these expenditures. While the United States was by far NATO's strongest actor in terms of military capability, nuclear deterrence, and global deployment, a significant portion of European allies kept their defense budgets limited, citing the post-war economic recovery process as justification. During this period, the United States became the primary force forming the military backbone of NATO, deploying hundreds of thousands of troops to the European continent, establishing air bases, and placing nuclear weapons at the center of European defense. In contrast, Western European countries, particularly France, Italy, and the Benelux nations, faced internal political pressures regarding increasing defense spending. In war-weary societies, military spending was in direct competition with goals of social welfare and economic development. This situation led to NATO's collective defense principle relying, in practice, largely on United States' military and financial contributions.

By the late 1950s, the growth of Soviet military capabilities, the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles, and the establishment of the Warsaw Pact had further intensified debates within NATO over insufficient defense spending. The United States administration began explicitly demanding that European allies increase their defense spending; these demands were voiced not only through diplomatic channels but also in public statements. Washington's central argument was that Europe's security could not be financed solely by American resources and that allies needed to invest more in their own defense. In this context, the issue of Germany held a special place within NATO. The rearmament of Germany, which had been heavily restricted militarily following World War II, sparked serious debates both within the European public sphere and within NATO. However, as the Soviet threat grew, enhancing West Germany's defense capabilities came to be seen as a necessary requirement for the alliance. Germany's accession to NATO and the rebuilding of its defense industry marked a turning point in the burden-sharing debates. Over time, Germany became one of the countries with the largest defense budgets within NATO; however, this process unfolded amid political and social tensions that spanned many years.

During the same period, NATO's southern flank also gained critical importance in terms of defense investments. Türkiye, which joined the alliance in 1952, stood out as one of the few NATO countries directly bordering the Soviet Union due to its geographical location. Despite its limited economic resources, Türkiye made significant contributions to the alliance through its manpower, ground forces, and strategic bases. Nevertheless, Türkiye's defense industry remained largely dependent on foreign sources; military aid provided by the United States and other allies formed the foundation of Türkiye's defense capabilities. This situation highlighted the need to evaluate burden-sharing discussions not only in terms of budget figures but also in terms of the nature of the contributions. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the ratio of defense spending to gross domestic product (GDP) became a frequently debated indicator within NATO. While the United States maintained its defense budget at high levels, some European countries' reduction of this ratio caused concern in Washington. Particularly during the Vietnam War, the United States' global military burden increased further, and the inadequacy of Europe's defense contribution became the subject of harsher criticism. During this period, United States officials argued that NATO risked becoming a "two-speed" alliance, that is, while some countries bore high costs, others consumed security almost for free.

Toward the end of the Cold War, although the weakening and eventual collapse of the Soviet Union temporarily pushed discussions on burden-sharing into the background, the issue never completely disappeared. On the contrary, with the disappearance of the common enemy, the justification for defense spending within NATO came under increasing scrutiny. Many European countries have significantly reduced their defense budgets, scaled back their defense industry capacity, and shut down production lines. While these developments provided short-term economic relief, they have weakened NATO's military readiness and crisis response capabilities in the long term.

In conclusion, the issue of increasing defense spending and ensuring a fair burden-sharing within NATO has been one of the alliance's most chronic problems since the early years of the Cold War. The imbalance between the United States' military and financial dominance and the limited contributions of European allies has manifested itself in various forms over time; however, it has never been fully resolved. The renewed debates over defense spending and production capacity today are a natural continuation of this historical context and remain a key factor in determining NATO's future resilience.

1.3 The Post-Cold War “Peace Dividend” and the Decline of the Defense Industry 1991–2001

With the official dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, not only did the bipolar structure of the international system come to an end, but NATO’s *raison d’être* and approach to defense also entered a period of profound reevaluation. The disappearance of the Soviet threat which had shaped the alliance’s military planning, defense investments, and industrial capacity for nearly four decades brought with it a wave of optimism in the Western world, often referred to as “the end of history.” During this period, a strong perception emerged particularly in Western European countries that the risk of war had been permanently eliminated; this perception legitimized the reduction of defense spending both politically and socially. This emerging new approach was termed the “peace dividend” in the literature, and it was argued that resources allocated to defense should be redirected toward social welfare, infrastructure, and economic development.

During this period, many NATO member countries have implemented dramatic cuts to their defense budgets. Germany, citing the heavy economic burdens resulting from reunification, has gradually reduced its defense spending; it has cut its military personnel by hundreds of thousands and closed numerous military bases. Similarly, while France has sought to maintain its global military presence, it has downsized its conventional forces and embarked on a process of consolidation and closures within its defense industry. The United Kingdom, meanwhile, has made significant cuts to its army, navy, and air force as part of defense reforms known as “Options for Change”; armored units and heavy weapon systems have been the areas most affected.

During this period, not only the major European powers but also smaller NATO members pursued similar policies. Countries such as Belgium, the Netherlands, and Italy reduced their defense budgets, cut military personnel, and made choices that increased their dependence on foreign defense industries. In these countries, the defense industry began to be viewed as an economic cost rather than a fundamental element of national security. While the closure of production lines, the reduction of ammunition stockpiles, and the cancellation of long-term procurement plans provided short term budget relief, they have seriously weakened long-term strategic capabilities.

Another notable aspect of this process is the widening gap in defense philosophies between the United States and its European allies. Despite the end of the Cold War, the Washington administration has largely maintained its global military presence; citing developments in the Middle East, the Balkans, and the Asia-Pacific region, it has kept its defense budget at relatively high levels. In contrast, European allies have implicitly accepted the United States’ role as a global security provider and have sidelined their own defense capabilities. This situation has given rise to the first serious instances of “strategic free riding” debates within NATO.

NATO’s eastward expansion in the 1990s further complicated this picture. Former Warsaw Pact countries such as Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic joined NATO with significant security expectations; however, their defense industries were dependent on the Soviet system, technologically backward, and financially weak. These countries’ efforts to meet NATO standards brought additional costs and sparked new debates over burden sharing within the alliance. As Western European countries cut their defense spending, it became unclear how the security needs of the new members would be met. During this period, Turkey occupied a unique position within NATO. Despite the end of the Cold War, Turkey argued that security risks had not

diminished due to its proximity to the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Middle East; it did not pursue a path of completely downsizing its defense capabilities. However, Türkiye's defense industry remained largely dependent on foreign sources during these years; domestic production initiatives made only limited progress. NATO's general trend toward defense reduction has created a clear contradiction with the security concerns of frontline countries like Türkiye.

The decline of the defense industry between 1991 and 2001 was not limited to budgetary figures alone; it also led to significant losses in terms of institutional memory, production continuity, and human resources. The dispersal of engineering staff, the cancellation of R&D projects, and the fragmentation of supply chains significantly eroded NATO's capacity to prepare for a prolonged, high-intensity conflict. This weakening was partially felt during the Yugoslav crises and Balkan interventions in the late 1990s; it became clear that NATO struggled to conduct operations without the United States' military weight.

Ultimately, the post-Cold War "peace dividend" period provided NATO with a temporary respite; however, the systematic downsizing of the defense industry and the neglect of production capacity have seriously undermined the alliance's strategic resilience. The decisions made between 1991 and 2001 formed the fundamental historical backdrop explaining why NATO was caught unprepared for the crises that emerged in subsequent years, and laid the groundwork for the current debates on defense investments.

1.4 The Post-September 11 Era: Asymmetric Threats and Spending Imbalances 2001-2014

The year 2001 marked a radical turning point not only in the international security environment but also in NATO's threat perception, defense investments, and understanding of burden-sharing. Following the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, Article 5 was invoked for the first time in NATO history, officially declaring that an attack on one member state would be considered an attack on the entire alliance. Then United States' President George W. Bush characterized the attacks as "equivalent to war"; NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson stated that the alliance stood in full solidarity with the United States. This development signaled the effective end of the post-Cold War policies of downsizing and the "peace dividend."

In the aftermath of 9/11, NATO's focus shifted from the possibility of large-scale interstate warfare to counterterrorism, asymmetric threats, intelligence sharing, and cross-border operations. With the transfer of command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan to NATO in 2003, the alliance assumed responsibility for a large-scale, long-term operation outside the Euro-Atlantic region for the first time in its history. The Afghanistan operation tested not only military capabilities but also the sustainability of allies' defense budgets and their operational resilience.

The United States has once again shouldered the greatest military and financial burden in Afghanistan. During the George W. Bush administration, the defense budget was rapidly increased, and the United States' global military presence was expanded. In contrast, the governments led by German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and later Angela Merkel sent troops to Afghanistan but imposed restrictions on operational authority and rules of engagement. France also participated in Afghanistan during the administrations of President Jacques Chirac and later Nicolas Sarkozy; however, the level of its contribution has been a constant subject of

debate due to public pressure and internal political discussions. British Prime Minister Tony Blair, as the United States' closest ally, provided strong support for the operations.

During this period, the issue of burden-sharing became even more pronounced. United States Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld openly stated that he found the military contributions of European countries insufficient; he criticized France and Germany in particular, drawing a distinction between "old Europe" and "new Europe." In response, Central and Eastern European countries such as Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria sought to establish closer security ties with the United States; these nations demonstrated greater willingness to participate in operations in order to strengthen their positions within NATO.

The Afghanistan operation also exposed shortcomings in NATO's defense industrial capabilities. A significant capability gap between the United States and Europe was clearly evident in the areas of unmanned aerial vehicles, strategic airlift, precision-guided munitions, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems. For example, the advanced technology systems possessed by the United States were available only on a limited scale in countries such as Italy, Spain, and Canada. This situation has sparked discussions within NATO about a "capability gap" and highlighted the need to evaluate defense investments not only in terms of quantity but also in terms of quality.

The 2008 war in Georgia, which took place during the presidency of Russian President Vladimir Putin, marked a new turning point in NATO's perception of threats. The possibility of conventional warfare between states which had been pushed to the background in the post-Cold War era has returned to the forefront. The prospect of Georgia's NATO membership heightened tensions between Russia and the West; in particular, the Baltic states Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania called for increased defense spending. During this period, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, who served as NATO Secretary General, frequently emphasized the need for allies to increase their defense budgets. With Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, the issue of defense spending within NATO has once again become a central agenda item. United States President Barack Obama called on European countries to increase their defense spending; at the 2014 Wales Summit, the goal of raising member states' defense spending to 2% of GDP was officially adopted.

However, significant disparities have emerged regarding the implementation of this target. While some countries, such as Greece and Poland, have exceeded the 2% target, major economies like Germany and Spain have fallen short of it. During the administration of United States President Donald Trump, this issue was framed in harsher political terms; Trump openly accused Germany and other European countries of making "insufficient contributions" and made statements questioning NATO's future.

During this period, Türkiye has become a subject of particular debate within NATO. Under the leadership of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Türkiye has, on the one hand, increased its defense spending and invested in its domestic defense industry; on the other hand, it has faced a serious crisis with the United States over its purchase of the S-400 system from Russia. This crisis has raised new questions regarding defense industry integration and political alignment within NATO.

The post-2001 period created a complex security environment in which NATO was forced to simultaneously combat both terrorism and resurgent state-sponsored threats. The defense industry's production lines, ammunition stocks, and heavy weapons capabilities which had been neglected for many years came back into focus in the mid-2010s; in particular, the inadequacy of Europe's defense capabilities in the face of Russia's military modernization program was openly debated. Consequently, the post-2001 period has been marked by intensified debates within NATO regarding increased defense investments, fair burden-sharing, and the rebuilding of industrial capacity. Significant differences emerged among the United States, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Poland, Türkiye, Italy, Spain, Canada, and the Baltic states regarding defense budgets, production capacity, and strategic priorities; leaders' rhetoric and national policies directly impacted the

alliance's resilience. This process should be regarded as one of the most critical phases forming the historical foundation of today's defense investment debates.

1.5 The 2014 Crimea Crisis and the 2% Defense Spending Target

The post-2014 period marked a turning point in NATO history, shifting from a phase of debate to one of necessity regarding defense investments and defense industrial capacity. Russian President Vladimir Putin's annexation of Crimea in 2014 effectively shattered the post-Cold War assumption that "the possibility of large-scale war in Europe no longer existed." This development triggered an existential alarm, particularly among NATO member states on the eastern flank; defense spending, production lines, and military readiness levels have once again become top priorities on the political agenda. The concept of deterrence, which had been debated at a theoretical level within NATO for many years, has been redefined in terms of concrete military capabilities.

Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were among the countries that reacted most strongly following the annexation of Crimea. These countries argued that Russia posed a threat not only to Ukraine but also directly to NATO territory, and pressured the United States and Western Europe to increase their defense spending. Polish President Andrzej Duda and government officials at the time demanded a permanent military deployment on NATO's eastern flank; as a result of these demands, NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence was deployed in the Baltic states and Poland.

During this process, the United States has once again assumed the role of the alliance's military guarantor. During President Barack Obama's administration, additional troops were deployed to Europe, and heavy armored units and ammunition stocks were redeployed to the continent. However, Washington has begun to criticize the inadequacy of European allies' defense spending in a more explicit and harsh tone. These criticisms evolved into a much more aggressive political rhetoric during the administration of Donald Trump, who succeeded Obama; Trump accused many NATO countries, particularly Germany, of "freeloading off the United States"

Germany has become one of the most controversial actors within NATO during this period. The Berlin administration, led by Chancellor Angela Merkel, has kept defense spending below the 2% target for a long time despite its economic strength; this has been sharply criticized by both the United States and Eastern European countries. Germany's reduction of production capacity in its defense industry, coupled with the fact that its stockpiles of ammunition and heavy weapons have become extremely limited, has directly impacted NATO's overall readiness level. Similar criticisms have been directed at Italy and Spain; these countries have long delayed defense investments, citing economic crises as justification.

During this period, French President Emmanuel Macron sparked a major debate within the alliance by stating that NATO might have "suffered brain death." Macron's remarks were seen as a reflection of criticisms regarding insufficient defense spending, a lack of strategic coordination, and excessive dependence on the United States. During this period, France intensified its calls for strengthening the European defense industry and achieving strategic autonomy independent of the United States; however, this approach was met with skepticism within NATO, particularly by Poland and the Baltic states.

Russia's comprehensive policy of invasion against Ukraine in 2022 served as the harshest warning in NATO history regarding defense industry and production capacity. The ammunition and weapons systems sent to Ukraine in the war's early months revealed just how limited NATO countries' stockpiles were. Countries such as Germany, the United Kingdom, Canada, and the Netherlands were forced to acknowledge that their ammunition stocks had dropped to critical levels in a short period of time. This situation clearly demonstrated that NATO was unprepared for a prolonged, high-intensity war.

With the war in Ukraine, the production lines of the defense industry have once again become a strategic issue. Efforts have been made to urgently increase the production of artillery shells, air defense systems, armored vehicles, and unmanned aerial vehicles in NATO countries; however, it has become clear that rebuilding this capacity in a short time is extremely difficult following years of downsizing. Countries such as the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Poland, in particular, have sought to support Ukraine by reactivating production infrastructure left over from the Soviet era. In this process, Türkiye has occupied a relatively exceptional position within the defense industry. Under the leadership of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Türkiye has expanded its production capacity for unmanned aerial vehicles, armored systems, and ammunition; this development has been closely monitored within NATO. However, Türkiye's relations with Russia have continued to spark political debates within NATO in the context of the war in Ukraine.

In conclusion, the 2014–2022 period has painfully demonstrated that defense investments and industrial capacity are now an unavoidable necessity for NATO. Divergences regarding defense spending, production capacity, and strategic priorities have become even more apparent among the United States, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Poland, the Baltic states, Türkiye, Italy, and Spain. This period has gone down in history as one of the harshest lessons demonstrating that NATO's future depends not only on political solidarity but also on concrete production capacity and sustainable defense investments.

1.6 Structural Inadequacies in Defense Industry Capacity

The situation NATO has faced since 2022 has now gone far beyond the framework of crisis management or limited regional deterrence. Russia's large-scale and protracted war against Ukraine has effectively forced NATO countries to think in terms of a "war economy"; the defense industry, ammunition production, and supply chains have become central security issues for the first time since the Cold War. The intense shipments of weapons and ammunition to Ukraine in the war's early months have laid bare just how limited NATO countries' own stockpiles are. Government officials have acknowledged that many NATO countries fell below critical thresholds within weeks for essential items such as artillery ammunition, air defense missiles, anti-tank systems, and armored vehicle parts. This situation has clearly demonstrated that NATO's defense industry model, optimized for peacetime, is insufficient to support a high intensity, protracted war.

Throughout this process, the United States has continued to serve as NATO's driving force, both militarily and industrially. The administration of President Joe Biden has emphasized that aid to Ukraine is not merely a matter of political support, but is also essential for maintaining NATO's deterrence. However, United States of Defense officials have clearly stated that even the United States' defense industry will struggle to sustain the current production rate to meet the pace of consumption in Ukraine in the long term. These statements have, for the first time within NATO, clearly brought to light the reality that the United States does not possess unlimited industrial capacity. Washington has therefore begun to pressure its European allies not only to increase their spending but also to expand their production capacities in concrete and measurable ways.

On the European front, however, the picture is more complex and fragmented. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz spoke of a historic turning point dubbed “Zeitenwende” immediately following the war and announced a special 100 billion euro fund for defense. However, the extent to which this fund has translated into tangible results on the ground and on production lines has become a major point of contention within NATO. It has frequently been noted that the German defense industry, due to years of downsizing, faces challenges in terms of skilled labor, raw materials, and production line capacity; meanwhile, bureaucratic processes have proven inadequate in addressing urgent needs. Similarly, French President Emmanuel Macron has argued that the defense industry must be restructured under a “permanent mobilization” framework; however, it has become evident that France’s production capacity remains limited compared to the demands of the war in Ukraine.

Eastern European countries, meanwhile, have assumed a different position within NATO during this period. Poland, through President Andrzej Duda and his government, has rapidly increased its defense spending and made large scale arms purchases from many countries, notably South Korea and the United States. Poland has explicitly stated that it aims not only to strengthen its own defense but also to become a production and logistics hub on NATO’s eastern flank. Countries such as the Czech Republic and Slovakia, meanwhile, have provided support to Ukraine by reactivating ammunition production infrastructure left over from the Soviet era; this situation has demonstrated just how critical the defense industries of small and medium sized countries can be within NATO as a whole.

In this new era, the United Kingdom has sought to redefine its role within NATO following Brexit. The British government has bolstered its claim to political leadership through the military support provided to Ukraine; however, it has also become evident that the British defense industry is facing serious bottlenecks in ammunition production. Southern European countries such as Italy and Spain, however, have been able to increase their defense industry investments only to a limited extent due to economic pressures, the energy crisis, and internal political balances. This situation has once again demonstrated that the perception of geographical threats within NATO directly influences defense spending.

One of the most notable aspects of this period has been Turkiye’s position. Under the leadership of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Turkiye has expanded its production capacity in unmanned aerial vehicles, munitions, and armored systems; this capacity has emerged as one of the few operational production ecosystems within NATO. However, Turkiye’s concurrent diplomatic relations with Russia and political tensions within NATO have raised the question of how this industrial capacity can be integrated across the alliance.

As a result, the post 2022 period has forced NATO to shift from a focus on theoretical deterrence to a debate over concrete industrial power. The defense industry is no longer merely a national issue; it has become a key determinant of the alliance’s collective survival capacity. Differences in production capacity among the United States, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Poland, the Czech Republic, Italy, Spain, and Turkiye, combined with leaders’ political rhetoric, have created a new map of power and responsibility within NATO. This landscape signals a historic era that compels delegates to assume responsibility not only through budgetary commitments but also through actual production, procurement, and sustainable warfighting capabilities.

1.7 The Political Dimension of the Burden-Sharing Debate

The debate over burden-sharing within NATO has never been merely a technical budgetary issue; rather, it has always been a matter deeply intertwined with political legitimacy, the balance of power within the alliance, and the relationships of trust among leaders. In particular, the weakening of the shared threat perception following the end of the Cold War has directly linked the issue of defense spending to domestic politics; this has transformed burden sharing from a military issue into a political crisis. In this context, the question of “who is paying how much?” within NATO has, over time, evolved into “who is keeping their word, and who is shifting the alliance’s burden onto others?”

For many years, the United States has been at the center of this political tension. United States administrations have repeatedly pointed out that European allies have systematically reduced their defense spending since the 1990s. However, these criticisms took on their harshest and most direct form during the Donald Trump administration. After taking office in 2017, Trump openly targeted countries such as Germany, France, and Italy at NATO summits, claiming that these nations “benefit from United States military protection without paying their fair share.” Although Trump’s statement that “you owe NATO” is legally debatable, its political impact was extremely destructive, leading to a crisis of trust within the alliance. Trump’s harshest criticisms were directed specifically at Germany. The Berlin government had failed for years to meet the target of raising defense spending to 2% of GDP (Gross Domestic Product); in contrast, it was accused of “reluctance” due to its economic size and budget surplus. By bringing Germany’s energy imports from Russia into the debate, Trump transformed the issue from a purely military one into an open political challenge with his remark: “The United States is protecting you from Russia, yet you’re paying Russia.” In response, then-German Chancellor Angela Merkel argued that NATO could not be evaluated solely based on a balance sheet; she emphasized that Germany’s contributions in terms of troops, logistics, hosting, and diplomacy were also part of the burden sharing.

A similar political tension has also arisen on the French front. President Emmanuel Macron has openly criticized the United States’ dominant role within NATO and Europe’s strategic dependence; he has linked the debate over defense spending to the issue of Europe’s “strategic autonomy.” Macron’s statement that “NATO’s brain death has occurred” has laid bare that the burden-sharing debate is not merely about money, but also about leadership and direction. While France argues that the United States is unilaterally steering European security, the United States claims that France is making political statements without providing sufficient military contributions.

Eastern European countries, however, have taken a completely different stance in this political debate. Countries such as Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have largely supported United States criticisms of the burden sharing arrangement. These countries have explicitly stated that they view the Russian threat as direct and existential; they have characterized Western Europe’s reduction in defense spending as “irresponsibility that jeopardizes the security of the East.” Polish President Andrzej Duda has repeatedly demanded at NATO summits that the United States military presence in Poland become permanent; he has turned this demand into a political argument by increasing defense spending above 2%. This political divide has also taken on a notable dimension from the perspective of the United Kingdom. London has pursued a strategy of increasing defense spending and aligning closely with the United States to strengthen its role within NATO following Brexit. This stance has positioned the UK as a bridge between the United States and Western Europe; however, it has also led to the UK maintaining a distance from European defense initiatives. This situation demonstrates that the burden-sharing debate is linked not only to economic factors but also to geopolitical orientations.

Turkiye, however, has occupied a unique and often contradictory position in this political debate. Despite having NATO’s second largest military, Turkiye has criticized the practice of measuring defense spending solely based on budget percentages. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has emphasized that Turkiye “pays the price on the ground” for NATO through cross-border operations, the refugee burden, and actual military engagements; yet he has argued that Turkiye remains subject to political pressure. Turkiye’s purchase of S-400 systems from Russia, however, has turned the burden sharing debate into a matter of trust; the United States and some European countries have begun to question Turkiye’s political alignment within the alliance.

With the war in Ukraine following 2022, this political tension has intensified further. Aid to Ukraine has made it clear which countries are contributing how much; publicly available tables and statements have become a mechanism for internal pressure within NATO. While the United States, Poland, and the Baltic states have used their high levels of contribution as a political bargaining chip, countries such as Germany, Italy, and Spain have made more cautious statements, citing domestic political balances as justification. This situation demonstrates that burden sharing has now become a decisive political issue not only in summit declarations but also in national parliaments, election campaigns, and media debates.

Ultimately, the political dimension of the burden-sharing debate clearly demonstrates that NATO is a platform of competing political interests rather than a purely technical military alliance. The statements, demands, and mutual accusations between the United States, Germany, France, Poland, the United Kingdom, and Turkiye demonstrate that the alliance's future depends not only on a shared perception of threats but also on the political will of its leaders and their ability to convince their domestic publics. This issue has become one of the most critical NATO debates, compelling delegates to examine not only defense figures but also the political calculations and strategic intentions behind them.

1.8 Expansion of Production Lines and Joint Defense Projects

One of the most profound and structural challenges NATO has faced in the post-Cold War era is that the defense industry has become not only a matter of security but also a tool for economic interests, technological competition, and political influence. Since the 2000s, the issue of the defense industry within NATO has shifted from the question of “who produces more?” to a debate over “whose systems will be procured, whose technology will become the standard, and whose companies will prevail?” **This situation has created a transatlantic fault line that directly affects the alliance's military cohesion.**

Naturally, the United States has been at the center of this competition. In addition to being NATO's military leader, the United States possesses the world's largest defense industry ecosystem, and a significant portion of NATO standards have effectively been shaped by American systems. The Pentagon and United States Defense companies have viewed NATO countries' preference for American-made systems in new weapons purchases as both a sign of military interoperability and political loyalty. This approach has been particularly evident around the F-35 program. United States administrations have presented this aircraft not merely as a combat platform but as the backbone of NATO's future air power; participation in the program has also become a measure of political loyalty.

This situation has caused significant concern among major European defense industry players. Under the leadership of President Emmanuel Macron, France has explicitly stated that Europe has become overly dependent on the United States defense industry. Macron has argued that defense interoperability within NATO must not devolve into a one-sided technological dependency; he has called for the support of Europe-centered defense projects. This approach has materialized particularly in the new-generation fighter jet and ground systems projects being developed along the France-Germany axis. However, these projects have further sharpened the “Europe or the United States?” dilemma within NATO.

Germany has adopted a dual stance in this tension. While Berlin seeks to maintain its strategic relations with the United States, it has also provided political support for the idea of strengthening the European defense industry. However, the slowness of Germany's decision-making processes and internal political reservations have frequently hindered the progress of these projects. This situation has been sharply criticized, particularly by countries such as Poland. **Poland has characterized Europe-centered projects as a “waste of time” and has preferred direct and rapid arms purchases from countries such as the United States and South Korea. This preference demonstrates that, within NATO, the defense industry is not merely a technical matter but a political choice based on threat perception.**

One of the most severe manifestations of this competition has been seen in the case of Türkiye. Türkiye has used American systems compliant with NATO standards for many years; however, in line with its goal of increasing domestic production in the defense industry, it has turned to seeking alternatives. The purchase of the S-400 air defense system from Russia under the leadership of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has created a crisis within NATO that is not merely military but also rooted in industry and technology. The United States characterized this move as incompatible with NATO systems and detrimental to alliance security, and removed Türkiye from the F-35 program. This development clearly demonstrated that defense industry choices within NATO have become directly linked to political sanctions. Similar debates, albeit at a lower intensity, have also taken place in countries such as Canada, Italy, and Spain. These nations have found themselves caught between budget constraints and the need for NATO compatibility; they have often been forced to opt for American systems. In contrast, the idea of strengthening the European defense industry through joint projects has progressed slowly in practice and has failed to achieve the desired impact due to a lack of political unity.

The war in Ukraine following 2022 has made this industrial competition even more apparent. The fact that the majority of weapons sent to Ukraine were American made has reinforced the United States defense industry's decisive role within NATO. In contrast, European countries have been forced to acknowledge the limitations of their own production capacities; this situation has brought the question "Why have we neglected our defense industry for years?" to the forefront of public discourse. At the same time, the surge in demand created by the war in Ukraine has brought the economic dimension of the defense industry even more to the forefront; which countries' companies will benefit from this process has created a silent arena of competition within NATO.

As a result, the issue of the defense industry within NATO is no longer merely a matter of military activity; it signifies a struggle over political dependence, economic interests, and technological dominance. The choices made by countries such as the United States, France, Germany, Poland, and Türkiye will determine whether NATO's defense industry structure will evolve into a unipolar or multipolar system in the future. This issue stands out as one of the most complex NATO dossiers, forcing delegates to simultaneously discuss not only security but also the interplay of power, money, and influence.

1.9 Current Tensions and Pressure on the Defense Industry

By the mid-2020s, NATO had entered one of the most complex and contradictory security environments it had faced since its founding; for the Alliance is now confronted not only with traditional military threats, but also with conflicting interests among allies, disputes over sovereignty, allegations of human rights violations, internal security measures, and crises of global legitimacy. In particular, the United States' foreign policy approach in recent years which has been more unilateral, interest-driven, and hard-power focused has profoundly disrupted the political balance within NATO. The ripple effects created by Washington's policies in Latin America, the Arctic region, and domestic security have pushed European allies into a difficult position both militarily and normatively; this situation has made the gap between the alliance's "shared values" rhetoric and its actual practices more visible.

On the Latin American front, Venezuela, despite not being a direct NATO member has indirectly taken center stage on the NATO agenda due to United States -led sanctions, diplomatic pressure, and calls for regime change. The administration led by Nicolás Maduro has been grappling with both economic embargoes and crises of international recognition since 2013; The declaration of Juan Guaidó as "interim president" in 2019, his recognition by the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and some European countries, and the continued support for Maduro by Türkiye, Russia, China, Iran, and Cuba have made the global polarization clearly visible through the lens of Venezuela. United States' oil sanctions, the freezing of PDVSA assets, and the blocking of access to the Venezuelan Central Bank's reserves have produced not only economic but also humanitarian consequences; the impact of these policies on the civilian population has become a subject of debate, particularly in the public spheres of Spain, Portugal, and France. At this point, a serious divergence of views has

emerged within NATO; while some allies characterize Washington's pressure policy as "resolve against authoritarian regimes," others assess it as "a dangerous precedent navigating the gray areas of international law."

During the same period, developments in the Arctic region fundamentally altered NATO's geographical perception. While Greenland had long been viewed as a northern territory of limited strategic importance, it has now become the center of great power competition due to new sea routes opened by climate change, rare earth elements, and opportunities for military deployment. The United States government's official mention in 2019 of the idea to "purchase" Greenland was recorded not merely as a diplomatic gaffe, but as a breaking point that undermined NATO's internal perception of sovereignty. While the Danish government firmly rejected this proposal, local governments and the people of Greenland have emphasized their right to self-determination; when combined with United States' efforts to expand its military presence in the region through Thule Air Base, this has deepened the "territorial integrity versus military necessity" dilemma among NATO allies. Northern countries such as Canada, Norway, and Iceland have expressed their concerns about the Arctic turning into a venue for a show of force within NATO through closed diplomatic channels.

In addition to these external tensions, United States' domestic security and immigration policies have also cast doubt on NATO's normative foundation. Deportation operations carried out by ICE, conditions in detention centers, family separations, and prolonged administrative detentions have been the subject of United Nations reports and harsh criticism from international human rights organizations. In Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, and the Scandinavian countries, the question, "On what moral ground is the alliance operating when its leading nation stands at this point regarding human rights?" has begun to be asked more loudly in the public sphere. These criticisms have reignited the debate over whether NATO is not only a military alliance but also a political and ethical one.

In addition to this, the Jeffrey Epstein case centered in the United States but resonating globally has not only created a direct military crisis but also sparked a profound crisis of legitimacy regarding the Western world's elites, the interplay of politics, finance, and media, and the selective application of the law. Politicians, businesspeople, and institutions mentioned or indirectly linked to the Epstein investigation have sparked a new wave of skepticism regarding the sincerity of the "Western values" narrative, particularly in Europe; this has further eroded NATO's image in the Global South. Countries such as Venezuela, Iran, and Russia have frequently raised such scandals on international platforms as evidence of the West's double standards.

When all these developments are considered together, NATO's current climate of tension is now taking shape not only on the front lines but also within the domestic politics, public opinion, and value perceptions of its allies. Sanctions and regime debates surrounding Venezuela, sovereignty and military deployment crises sparked by Greenland, human rights scrutiny triggered by ICE operations, and the crisis of elite trust caused by the Epstein case all demonstrate that while the alliance discusses defense investments and burden-sharing, it is actually confronting a far deeper issue: Will NATO remain merely a military structure that shares weapons and budgets, or will it continue as a genuine security community that also demands political, legal, and moral consistency from its members? The answer to this question depends directly on the positions delegates take and how they manage these tensions.

1.10 General Assessment and Concerns Regarding NATO's Future

Today, NATO is facing a profound test that cannot be explained solely by military capacity, defense budgets, or deterrence; the fundamental issue facing the Alliance is the question of what principles and shared

vision it will base its existence on. Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has constantly had to redefine itself, expanding into areas such as counter-terrorism, crisis management, peacekeeping, cybersecurity, and hybrid threats. However, this expansion has brought with it strategic ambiguity. Today, for many allies, there is no clear consensus on what constitutes the primary threat to NATO, which geography should be considered a priority, and which crises should be addressed within the scope of collective defense. This slows down the alliance's decision-making mechanisms and undermines its image of unity in times of crisis. The issue of defense investment and burden-sharing has become perhaps one of the most visible yet intractable problems for NATO's future. The United States has long accused its European allies of insufficient defense spending; these criticisms are sometimes expressed in rhetoric that borders on open threats. In contrast, countries like Germany, Italy, Spain, and Belgium argue that defense spending cannot be measured solely by quantity, but that political stability, diplomacy, and economic resilience are also part of security. This difference in approach creates the risk of NATO becoming a "two-speed alliance" in the future: on one side, countries with high military capacity and a willingness to intervene, and on the other, more cautious allies with high domestic public pressure and a distance from military engagement. If this divergence deepens, the possibility of NATO's principle of collective defense being effectively weakened becomes a serious concern.

Another fundamental element threatening the future of the Alliance is the inconsistency between the rhetoric of shared values and practical applications. While democracy, human rights, and the rule of law are central to NATO's political identity, the domestic policies and external interventions of some allies openly contradict these principles. This not only erodes trust within NATO but also undermines the Alliance's global legitimacy. In the Global South, NATO is now often perceived not as a "security provider," but as a bloc that imposes its interests through military force. This perception allows actors like Russia and China to expand their discourse and gives anti-NATO discourse more traction. Technological transformation and the changing nature of warfare are also among the biggest areas of uncertainty facing NATO. Cyberattacks, AI-powered weapon systems, space-based military infrastructures, and information warfare are challenging the classic concept of collective defense. It remains unclear at what point a cyberattack against a NATO country constitutes an "armed attack," and whether Article 5 can be invoked in such a case. This uncertainty is seen as a serious security vulnerability, particularly for the Baltic states, Poland, and Eastern European allies. Simultaneously, NATO's reliance on civilian infrastructure and the private sector in these new threat areas is becoming a limiting factor in the alliance's control capacity.

Perhaps the most critical risk for NATO's future is the lack of political will and the weakening of domestic public support. In many allied countries, especially among the younger generation, perceptions of NATO are becoming increasingly questioning. Increased military spending at the expense of social policies, the uncertainty surrounding the tangible returns of long term foreign engagements, and inconsistencies in the alliance's responses to crises are eroding NATO's internal legitimacy. This could make it difficult for tough and costly decisions to gain democratic support in the future, effectively leading the alliance towards a more passive structure.

In conclusion, today NATO faces not only external threats but also its own structural limitations. Defense investments, industrial capacity, and military preparedness are, of course, critically important; however, they are not sustainable without a shared strategic vision, a consistent value system, and strong political will. Current tensions are testing the alliance's resilience and clearly demonstrating that NATO's future is not automatically guaranteed. Therefore, the real question facing NATO is not "how to produce more weapons," but "for what purpose, according to what principles, and at what cost will it continue to exist?" The decisions that delegates make, taking this general framework into account, will determine the alliance's role, and even its very existence, in the coming decades.

2.NATO's general cyber defense approach and actions consistent with this approach

2.1 NATO's Approach to Cyber Defense

- NATO views cyberspace as a constant battleground. NATO's fundamental views in this area are as follows:
- NATO considers cyber defense an integral part of its core mission of "deterrence and defense." Large scale malicious cyber activity can be considered an "armed attack" and may trigger Article 5 of NATO's collective defense clause.
- NATO adopts a comprehensive approach to countering cyber threats, with integrated political, military, and technical levels.

2.2 Cyber Threats

- NATO states that cyberattacks are increasingly being used to destabilize the Alliance, cripple critical infrastructure, disrupt military operations, and steal intellectual property. Two main actors stand out:

Russia has demonstrated in its aggression against Ukraine that cyber activities are an integral part of modern warfare.

China's coercive policies, hybrid and cyber operations, and disinformation campaigns threaten NATO's security and democratic systems.

2.3 Key Policies and Strategic Steps

- NATO's cyber defense capabilities have been shaped over the years through significant milestones:
- NATO allies have pledged to prioritize strengthening their national cyber defenses and critical infrastructure
- NATO has adopted a policy emphasizing the need for a continuous response to cyber threats in times of crisis, peace, or conflict, using all available tools
- NATO has established a mechanism to provide rapid national support to allied countries that have suffered serious cyber attacks.

2.4 Institutional Structure and Capacity Development

- NATO supports policy-making with concrete technical and military structures:
- The NATO Cyber Security Centre protects NATO's own networks 24/7.
- The Cyber Space Operations Centre provides situational awareness to military commanders and coordinates operations.
- Cyber Emergency Response Teams are on standby 24 hours a day to assist allies upon request.
- NATO emphasizes that cyber defense is as "human" focused as it is technology-focused. Capacity building is achieved through the annual Cyber Coalition exercise, the NATO Cyber Training Ground in Estonia, the Centre of Excellence, and training institutions in Italy and Germany.

2.5 Collaboration and Governance

- NATO recognizes that cyber threats know no borders. Therefore, it attaches great importance to cooperation with non-state actors and other international organizations:
- NATO maintains strong cooperation with the European Union, particularly in sharing information and best practices against hybrid threats.
- NATO considers the innovative power of the private sector in cyberspace vital and aims for integration with academia and industry.
- All these processes are under the political oversight of the North Atlantic Council. The NATO Chief Information Officer, as the sole authority on cybersecurity matters across NATO, manages the integration of IT systems.

2.6 Development and Strategic Turning Points

- **Collective Defense and Article 5**
For NATO, cyber defense is no longer just a technical issue. It is now an existential task for the Alliance. A historic decision was made at the 2014 Wales Summit: when the effects of a cyber attack are devastating, this is considered a valid reason to invoke Article 5, which obligates allies to protect one another. In other words, a cyber attack on one ally can be considered an attack on all.
- **Cyberspace as an Operational Arena**
At the 2016 Warsaw Summit, cyberspace was officially declared an “operational domain” by NATO. This means that NATO is now actively planning in cyberspace, just as it does on land, sea, and air, coordinating allied operations in this area, and updating its military doctrines to focus on cyber threats. This has further strengthened NATO's role in cyberspace.
- **Cyber Defence Commitment**
Launched in 2016 and strengthened in 2023, the Cyber Defence Commitment requires allies to do their homework. Each country pledges to allocate budgets and resources to strengthen its national networks and critical infrastructure. Because the Alliance's overall strength is only as strong as the cyber resilience of its weakest link. This commitment ensures that allies fulfill their obligations regarding cyber defence.
- **2002 - 2008 (Awareness and Initial Policies):** At the 2002 Prague Summit, cyber defense was first placed on the political agenda. Following the cyberattacks against Estonia in 2007, which alerted the Alliance, work accelerated, and in January 2008, NATO's first Cyber Defence Policy was approved.
- **2010 - 2014 (Transition to Collective Defense):** At the 2010 Lisbon Summit, it was acknowledged that cyberattacks could reach a level that threatens national security. The 2014 Wales Summit was a historic step; it was officially recognized that cyber defense is part of collective defense (Article 5) and that international law applies in cyberspace.
- **2016 (Cyber Operation Area Declaration):** At the Warsaw Summit, cyberspace was recognized as an official domain of operations, like land, sea, and air. Furthermore, Allies signed the Cyber Defence Pledge for the first time to strengthen their national infrastructure.
- **2021 - 2023 (Comprehensive Integration):** At the 2021 Brussels Summit, the Comprehensive Cyber Defence Policy was approved, stating that "cumulative cyberattacks" with devastating effects could be considered armed attacks. At the 2023 Vilnius Summit, these policies were strengthened with a new concept, reinforcing the role of cyberspace in NATO's deterrence posture.

2.7 Building Corporate Structures and Operational Strength

- **Cyber Space Operations Center (CyOC):**This center is part of NATO's military component. Here, they monitor and manage situations in cyberspace. During an operation, they coordinate the cyber capabilities of the allies and provide support to NATO military commanders. At the same time, they ensure the Alliance's freedom of movement in cyberspace.
- **Virtual Cyber Incident Support Capability (VCISC):**Launched at the 2023 Vilnius Summit, this innovative system provides assistance to an allied country when it faces a major cyber attack. It operates through a virtual platform. In times of cybercrisis, it makes the expertise and technical resources of allies available to the country in need.
- **NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA) and NCSC:**Established in 2012 within the NCIA, the NATO Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) is responsible for protecting NATO's own networks continuously through a centralized system.
- **Cyberspace Operations Center:** Established in Belgium in 2018, this center provides military commanders with situational awareness in the cyber domain and coordinates operations. Furthermore, since 2018, NATO has been able to utilize allies' national cyber capabilities for its own missions (similar to using tanks or aircraft in the field).
- **Cyber Emergency Response Teams:**With the approval of the North Atlantic Council, Rapid Reaction Teams have been established, standing by 24 hours a day to provide immediate assistance to allies in the event of cyber crises.
- **Chief Information Officer (CIO):** Appointed in 2021, it became the sole authority across NATO for Information and Communication Technology (ICT) systems harmonization and cybersecurity incident management.

2.8 Training, Drills, and Capacity Building Activities

Cooperation between NATO, the European Union, and industry is crucial. Cyber threats can transcend national borders, which is why there is constant information sharing between NATO and the European Union. CERT-EU is used for this purpose. Many new technologies are developed in the private sector, so NATO works closely with industry and academic institutions. This allows it to utilize the latest cyber defense technologies. NATO conducts major cyber defense exercises every year. For example, exercises like “Cyber Coalition” are carried out. The aim of these exercises is to ensure that allies work together and counter cyber attacks. Under realistic scenarios, countries learn how to cooperate with each other. Thus, how each country will respond in a crisis is planned in advance.

- **Defence Planning Process (NDPP):**Since 2012, cyber defense requirements have been included in the planning process, and standards and targets are being set for the cyber capabilities of member states.
- **Training Centers:**Through the NATO Cyber Range and Joint Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) in Estonia, the NCI Academy in Portugal, the NATO School in Germany, and the NATO Defence College in Italy, cyber training has been placed on a multinational and academic footing.
- **Exercises and Information Sharing:**The Alliance has incorporated cyber elements into its Crisis Management Exercises (CMX) and launched its traditional annual **Cyber Coalition Exercise**. At the technical level, a "Malware Information Sharing Platform" has been established for the rapid sharing of threat indicators.

2.9 Comprehensive Partnerships and New Mechanisms

- **Integration with the European Union (EU):**In 2016, a Technical Arrangement was signed between the NATO Cyber Security Centre and the EU's rapid response team (CERT-EU), establishing a framework for direct information sharing. That same year, more than 40 joint measures focusing on

exercises and research against hybrid threats were implemented. (A similar political framework agreement was signed with Finland, then a partner country, in 2017).

- **Partnering with Industry:**The NATO Industrial Cyber Partnership (NICP), launched after the 2014 Wales Summit, has ensured the integration of technological innovations and expertise from the private sector into NATO's defense.
- **Virtual Cyber Incident Support Capability (VCISC):**Established at the 2023 Vilnius Summit, this new mechanism operationalizes the provision of emergency, national-level damage mitigation support to countries that have experienced serious cyberattacks.

3. Operation: “The GAP”

3.1 31.08 2026 Detection of digital anomalies and deviations at the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) and NATO Headquarters

Initial anomaly detections were recorded during routine network monitoring activities conducted by the NATO Cooperation Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence and NATO Headquarters in Brussels. The detected deviations were initially classified as low-priority events; observed delays in data packets were in the millisecond range, and inconsistencies in system logs were assessed within statistical margin of error limits. However, an examination of the temporal distribution of these anomalies revealed that these events were not random and occurred systematically at specific intervals without triggering alarm thresholds.

Subsequently, similar digital anomalies were detected simultaneously in NATO network components located in different geographical locations. These anomalies, particularly observed in core data routing systems, authentication servers, and internal communication infrastructures, indicated that the event may have been a coordinated cyber activity rather than an isolated system failure. Accordingly, incident response protocols were activated, attempts were made to isolate the affected network segments, and data traffic was subjected to detailed analysis. However, the analyses did not reveal any clear entry points or traces of malware indicating a conventional external attack.

Further investigations revealed breaches in the integrity of system logs. Some access logs were processed with a delay, while others were completely deleted; conversely, forged log entries were created containing seemingly generated but ineffective transactions. This demonstrates not only the possibility of unauthorized access but also the potential manipulation of system monitoring and control mechanisms. These findings strengthen the possibility that the threat originated from a complex structure embedded within the system and remained undetected for a long time.

Furthermore, analysis of how the anomalies spread across the network revealed evidence suggesting that the event was managed by a centralized control mechanism. Observing deviations starting at a specific network node and spreading to data centers in different countries within a short period demonstrates the high level of coordination and system knowledge required for this activity. This suggests that the attack may have been not merely a technical breach but also a strategically planned operation.

One of the most striking aspects of the event was the abrupt termination of all anomalies within a specific timeframe. Systems quickly returned to normal operating modes, but final checks revealed a single highly encrypted data packet of unknown origin within the network. Although the contents of this packet remain undeciphered, it is believed to be directly related to the beginning and end of the event.

3.2 01.10.2026: System Crashes and Access Issues Related to the "Gap Operation"

On October 1, 2026, system disruptions related to a process codenamed "Operation Gap" were simultaneously detected at the NATO Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence and NATO Headquarters, as well as in the critical infrastructure of member and host countries. Initial assessments showed significant slowdowns and disruptions in access to a large portion of the systems connected to the network structure at NATO headquarters. This directly impacted data sharing and coordination processes, limiting the crisis management capabilities of member states.

The disruptions affected not only NATO headquarters but also the internal communication and data processing infrastructure of some member states, leading to the complete loss of some critical state recovery. According to data examined in system logs, a significant amount of access permissions were denied, some data was lost from non-storable sources, and some critical operations were delayed. In this situation, member states' cyber operations continued, and their ability to coordinate crises and exchange information was disrupted. Technical analyses revealed that the disruptions did not originate from a single central server or service.

Simultaneous access restrictions and system slowdowns occurred at different network nodes, triggering a chain reaction in other systems. In some cases, even organized systems with normal access rights to secure their own infrastructure became inaccessible, disrupting planning and internal communication processes. Investigations into data integrity revealed that some critical blocks of information were deliberately rendered inaccessible, severely restricting data exchange between the NATO network and member states. The findings suggest that the incident may not have been merely a technical malfunction, but a pre-planned, highly coordinated, multi-layered cyberattack. Subsequent follow-up investigations necessitated a continued detailed analysis of all network and communication components related to "Operation Gap" and an urgent review of the security of member states' national cyber infrastructures. This highlighted the need for a reassessment of crisis management within NATO and at the national level.

3.3 01.01.2027 "The Black Echo" hacker network has published the "joke.zip" file publicly across the digital world'

"The Black Echo" hacker network, at 00:00 on 1 January 2027, which previously caused anomalies and deviations in the cybersecurity defences of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) and NATO Headquarters, and which played a leading role in "Operation GAP", hacked all digital platforms worldwide in public spaces where people are deeply immersed in the digital world, such as Times Square, Shibuya Crossing, Nathan Road, The Las Vegas Strip etc. ,

where people are deeply immersed in the digital world, as well as on news channels, in advertising content and similar venues, hacking into all digital platforms worldwide and directing people to a file containing the “joke.zip” file.

The file, released to the public under the name “joke.zip”, is reported to contain a significant amount of sensitive and inappropriately disclosed data originating from certain NATO member states, much of which was not intended to be accessible to the general public. Although initially presented in a frivolous or misleading manner, the archive’s contents have raised serious concerns regarding information security, data protection and the wider implications of unauthorised disclosure. This incident highlighted the vulnerability of digital infrastructure and demonstrated how leaks presented as seemingly insignificant or accidental can, in fact, have serious political, institutional and strategic consequences for allied states.

3.4 17.03.2027 The publication and access restrictions imposed by certain NATO member states following the circulation of the “joke.zip” file

Following the worldwide release of the file known to the public as “joke.zip” on 17 March 2027, certain NATO member states reportedly introduced a series of publication and access restrictions in an effort to limit the political, legal and security implications of the leak. While the file was initially presented in an unserious or misleading manner, further evaluation revealed that it may contain a series of non-public digital materials linked to specific allied states. The presence of such information in a public archive immediately raised concerns among government agencies, cybersecurity authorities and defence-related bodies, particularly as the data in question was not intended for unrestricted civilian or international circulation.

Reportedly, the affected NATO member states have taken restrictive measures aimed at limiting both the visibility and circulation of the content in question in both public and digital spaces. It is alleged that these measures include requests for the temporary removal of content, blocking access to certain online platforms, monitoring distribution channels, and tightening publication standards for organisations handling potentially sensitive information. In some cases, it was reported that, whilst internal investigations were being conducted, public access to certain databases, archive materials or government-linked information portals was restricted or suspended as a precautionary measure.

3.5 29.07.2027 Following the restrictions imposed on the public by NATO members, the affected people launched an uprising to protest against the government

Following the restrictions imposed by some NATO member states, it has been reported that public dissatisfaction among the affected groups is growing. Many individuals and civil society groups have described the new restrictions on access, broadcasting and digital visibility as disproportionate responses that go beyond the immediate security concerns triggered by the leak. In particular, concerns regarding transparency, freedom of information and the state's increasing role in controlling the digital sphere have contributed to the emergence of a climate of mistrust between governments and certain sections of the public. What initially emerged as a cyber security and privacy issue has gradually begun to evolve into a broader political debate centred on civil liberties and government accountability.

According to reports, protests and acts of public resistance were organised in many of the affected regions; demonstrators opposed measures they perceived as restrictive government policies that did not represent the people. Despite differences in the scale and violence of the uprisings, these protests reflected a deeper societal reaction to the perception that public access and civil voices had been weakened in the wake of the incident. The protest demonstrated how information control measures, implemented under conditions of already high public tension, could rapidly contribute to wider instability and deepen the divisions between governing institutions and the people they sought to govern.

4. Terminology

- **Cyber Defence:** *Cyber defence refers to the policies, technologies, and operational measures used to protect digital systems, networks, and data from cyberattacks. It includes prevention, detection, response, and recovery efforts against malicious cyber activities.*
- **Hybrid Warfare:** *Hybrid warfare is a strategy that combines conventional military force with non-military tactics such as cyberattacks, disinformation, economic pressure, and proxy actors. Its purpose is to destabilize and weaken a target while avoiding direct large-scale confrontation.*
- **Cyber Threats:** *Cyber threats are malicious activities conducted through digital means that aim to disrupt, damage, steal, or manipulate information and systems. These threats may originate from state actors, criminal groups, hackers, or independent individuals.*
- **Critical Infrastructure:** *Critical infrastructure refers to the essential systems and assets necessary for the functioning of a state and the well-being of its population, such as energy grids, transportation, healthcare, water supply, and communication*

networks. Disruption of these sectors can have severe national and international consequences.

- **Cyber Deterrence:** *Cyber deterrence is the strategy of discouraging hostile cyber activities by convincing potential attackers that the costs of such actions will outweigh the benefits. This may involve defensive resilience, diplomatic signaling, legal consequences, or the threat of retaliation.*
- **Information Warfare:** *Information warfare is the deliberate use of information, disinformation, propaganda, and digital influence operations to shape public perception, manipulate narratives, and weaken political or social stability. It is often used to complement broader military or strategic objectives*
- **Collective Defence (Article 5):** *An attack on one NATO member is considered an attack on all members, and a collective response is required.*
- **Deterrence:** *strategy of demonstrating strong military capacity to deter the enemy from attacking.*
- **Strategic Stability:** *balanced security environment where the risk of war between major powers is kept low.*
- **Alliance Cohesion:** *The ability of NATO members to act in unity and make joint decisions.*
- **Ammunition Stockpiles:** *Reserves of ammunition stored in advance for war or crisis situations.*
- **Burden-sharing:** *The fair sharing of defense costs and responsibilities among NATO members.*
- **Armed Attack:** *An armed attack refers to the use of force by a state or organized actor against another state, its territory, population, or armed forces. In international law, it is generally considered a grave form of aggression that may justify the right to self-defence*

5. Questions to be Addressed (QTBA)

- To what level should intelligence be shared among member states, and how should this process be standardized?
- If a state actor is found to be behind the incident, what should NATO's response be?
- Should a common NATO response protocol be established against cyber threats?
- How should this incident be assessed under international law?
- Are NATO's crisis management mechanisms adequate to handle such simultaneous system failures?
- How should the balance between freedom of expression and cybersecurity be struck?
- How can international cooperation be strengthened to identify and prosecute cybercriminals?
- To what extent are the access restrictions imposed by NATO member countries legitimate, and do these restrictions violate fundamental human rights and freedoms? Should NATO have the authority to intervene in domestic political crises?

COMMITTEE DYNAMICS

1. General Differences of the Committee Dynamics from the Rules of Procedure

Apart from the formal MUN Rules of Procedure, members of the North Atlantic Council are not delegates, but *Ambassadors*. The formal address of the members is *Ambassador of [Country]*.

Their formal names are *Permanent Ambassador of [Country] in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation*.

Along with the specific boundaries and additions. The remaining and unspecified rules regarding the committee and conference are specified in the official *Rules of Procedure of Istanbul Technical University Model United Nations Conference 2026*.

Members of the Council are affiliated with their countries' formal embassies to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. (*ie. The Permanent Ambassador of the Republic of Türkiye in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation is affiliated with the Permanent Embassy of the Republic of Türkiye.*)

Ambassadors of the Council cannot make any decision regarding their country, its legal and military organs. They are allowed to have private conversations with the formal bodies of their countries.

2. Vetoes

Each member of the Council has their rights to veto the documents and decisions that have passed in the Council. In order to use their right to veto, countries should write a formal decree to the board or raise motions to veto the passed documents.

Delegates can also send message papers to veto a specific document.

To deliver a formal veto, delegates have to deliver a speech or a formal text to explain the reason for the veto.

The chair can either accept or reject the veto sent by a delegate.

If the chairboard approves a veto, the formal document instantly fails.

Delegates cannot raise a veto more than one (or two upon the chair's discretion). Vetoed documents can later be put on vote.

3. Formal Debate

The formal debate of the Historical NATO committee is simply based on the Semi-Moderated Caucus.

A Semi-Moderated Caucus is a caucus that takes place within the formal proceedings of the Cabinet's session.

The maximum time duration of a speech is 5 minutes. Its purpose is to facilitate debate on specific issues. The Council Member raising the motion must briefly explain the purpose of the Semi-Moderated Caucus. They do not specify a total time limit or a time limit for individual speeches.

The Committee Director is the only authority with the means of deciding the total time of the Caucus and may interrupt or terminate the speech of any Council Member.

In Semi-Moderated Caucuses, the right to speak is always granted, and Council Members may remain seated while they are delivering their speech. A “Motion for a Semi-Moderated Caucus” requires a simple majority and the approval of the Committee Board to pass.

Delegates may also raise motions upon the Moderated Caucuses.

4. Tour de Table

The President shall have the discretion to conduct a Tour de Table at any time during the formal session.

During the Tour de Table, each Ambassador shall briefly outline their views on the matter under discussion.

The time allocated to each speaker shall be determined by the committee board.

Tour de Table automatically terminates when the last speaker in the chamber finalises their speech.

Committee Board members shall be included in the Tour de Table. Delegates cannot raise a motion to have, extend, or terminate a Tour de Table.

5. Operations

The members of the charter can propose documents in order to conduct a military operation under the title of NATO.

In order to propose an operation, delegates need to discuss the details and the scope of the operation.

Once the discussion concludes, one or more delegates will sign a document including the specifications of the operation.

The documents related to the operation are likely similar to the operation directives in the crisis committees.

Delegates must propose press releases after the operation orders.

To commit to the operation proposed, the chairboard will establish a voting procedure.

Apart from the formal voting procedures, the voting for the operation proposals can be conducted under the chair's discretion by reading the document and conducting placard voting afterwards.

The Board may vote on the operations and the press releases either individually or together regarding its discretion.

The document requires at least two-thirds ($\frac{2}{3}$) of the total votes.

Delegates cannot remain abstained during the voting procedure regarding the documents.

The proposed document can be amended after getting rejected.

The operations must be added to the communique.

6. Press Releases

Members of the charter can propose press releases to deliver their opinion regarding the discussed situation, individually, jointly, and as a committee. This document aims to change public opinion related to NATO's or countries' individual stances on the discussion. There are three types of press releases:

Individual Press Releases

Countries individually may deliver press releases announcing the countries' formal stances on the topic.

Delegates can directly send their press releases by writing "*Individual Press Release*" at the top of the formal documents, through and with the chairboard's approval.

7. Joint Press Releases

Two or more countries may deliver press releases announcing their stances together. In order to deliver a joint press release, each delegate wishing to contribute to the document has to write and sign their name below the document.

Delegates can directly send their press releases by writing "*Joint Press Release*" at the top of the formal documents, through and with the chairboard's approval.

8. Committee Press Releases

Countries may deliver press releases as a whole committee; these documents will be delivered under the title of NATO and represent the entire organisation.

Delegates must discuss the contents of the press release.

To deliver and vote upon the document, at least one-third ($\frac{1}{3}$) of the committee has to sign it.

Delegates may deliver the press release directly to the chair by writing "*Committee Press Release*" on top of the document.

Once the committee board obtains the press release, the document is to be put on vote. In order to pass and publish the document, at least two-thirds ($\frac{2}{3}$) of the committee has to vote in favour of the document.

Delegates can veto the document.

The committee press releases must be put in the communique. Press releases must contain the details regarding where, when, and what will be published in the

specified news organisations. The releases can be published in TV , radio, and newspapers.

Delegates may send press releases to the following news organisations:

Germany - Die Welt, Der Spiegel

United Kingdom - BBC (British Broadcasting Channel), The Guardian

Türkiye - TRT (Turkish Radio and Television Corporation), Hürriyet

United States - CNN US, The Washington Post

Kosovo - Rilindja, RTS (Radio Television Serbia)

International - Reuters, AP (Associated Press)

Delegates cannot take back the press releases they have sent.

The press releases may not be published regarding the political position of NATO on the discussions.

The public approval may increase, decrease, or remain the same.

The committee board may reject or hold the press releases.

Communique

The official substantive document created by the committee is a communique, and it is nothing but the compiled substantive documents produced during the duration of the Committee.

Communiqués contain actions of the NAC submitted in draft form under the sponsorship of the delegations working in a council. Additionally, communiqués address an opinion on a given

situation and recommend action plans to be enforced by the Alliance.

NATO Communiqués have a legally binding character for all members of the Alliance.

Draft communiqués at the moment of their submission are considered to have gathered the concurrent opinion of a large majority of states within the Council, but still are to be debated and revised through the amendment procedure. The NAC Draft Communiqués have to be adopted in absolute consensus.

The communique shall include all the directives, press releases and clauses written and voted upon and accepted by the Committee.

Example Communique

COMMUNIQUE

Ambassadors' Meeting of the North Atlantic Council

held at NATO Headquarters

Brussels, 3 May 1999

On 24 September 1998, the North Atlantic Council met in the Ambassadors Session in Brussels, in order to discuss the ongoing situation between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Kosovo following the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1199.

Throughout the meeting, the 16 permanent ambassador member states debated and discussed possible solutions to try to end the crisis or decrease the tension in the region. Evidently, with the collaboration and help of member states, NGOs, and international organizations such as the OSCE. With the cooperation of the OSCE, we, NATO, were able to receive information about the Kosovo region's conditions, such as but not limited to, the security and the Kosovo-Albanians' conditions. With the OSCE's cooperation and reports, we were able to receive and comprehend the full situation from a trusted source and act accordingly.

NATO decided on conducting a military drill on the North Aegean and the Adriatic Sea between 1-14 November 1998, in order to prepare for its potential involvement in the ongoing and/or further coming conflict in the Balkans. The drills mission was to conduct aerial exercises around the borders of the Italian airspace and Greek lands with bombardment planes, especially in the mountains region, in order to invite the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to convince them into declaring a ceasefire, displaying a potential hard power. The drills were a success as they were persuaded into a ceasefire with Kosovo.

NATO, under the primary initiative and encouragement of Italy, planned to expand 'Operation Rainbow,' which had been originally launched by Italy. Due to crimes against humanity, massacres, and forced displacement committed by Federal Republic of Yugoslavia forces in the Kosovo region, nearly 300,000 Kosovar Albanians were left destitute with the onset of winter. Furthermore, attempts were made to reach an agreement with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia government to extend this aid into the Kosovo region; however, due to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia government's reluctance, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) attempted to enforce this measure but unfortunately was unsuccessful. To address health issues exacerbated by the approaching winter, cooperation was sought with organizations such as the International Rescue Committee, World Health Organization (WHO), Doctors Without Borders and the Red Cross. Additionally, joint efforts were pursued with the Action Against Hunger and the World Food Program (WFP) to address starvation in the region. Proposals were made to deploy peacekeeping forces to work alongside local police to facilitate the security of civilians and the delivery of aid. However, despite all of North

Atlantic Treaty Organization's humanitarian requests and encouragements, these efforts ultimately failed due to the reluctance of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia government and their refusal of collaboration ended with the Kosovo region becoming extremely unstable and dangerous due to this reason NGOs were forced to leave the region and other organizations could not approach the Kosovo region.

NATO, sent a formal ultimatum to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on 16 January 1999, as a response to the Raçak massacre, where on the 15th of January 1999, 45 civilians mostly Kosovar-Albanians, including women and children were murdered by the Serbian police and special forces, in the village of Raçak, Kosovo. The ultimatum strongly condemned the actions of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as they were direct violations of the Geneva Convention.

The ultimatum was also aimed to resolve the crisis and establish peace in the Kosovo region, as well as to prevent any further war crimes and violations of human rights. The terms of the ultimatum were first and foremost that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia would retrieve their forces out of the Kosovo territory in less than 24 hours, and establish a ceasefire, ensuring the restriction of any further hostility towards the Kosovo region.

After its declaration, the ultimatum was rejected by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia without a specified reason.

The refusal of the ultimatum was followed by an invitation from the President of the United States of America for a peace meeting between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Region of Kosovo.

In order to ensure long-lasting peace in the conflict area we as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation have come to unanimous peace terms for the area of interest, which are the following; The region of Kosovo shall be established as an autonomous region within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the heavy weaponry in the Kosovo region must get ceased, the institutions in the Kosovo region must only belong to the Kosovo autonomous region, the international politics of Kosovo autonomous region shall be under Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the jurisdiction of Kosovo autonomous region must be independent from the federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Serbian police force will not act in Kosovo, instead the Yugoslav police will ensure the order in Kosovo. Moreover, in order to maintain peace it has been agreed upon that Kosovo may request a referendum after 9 months of the Kosovo region being autonomous in order to establish their own independence.

With these actions, NATO aimed to restrain the forces from further escalation of the conflict. However our goals, and wants have not been met after Milosevic and the

Kosovar-Albanian representative, Ibrahim Rugova left the meeting early showing that they were against our peace terms.

NATO, while striving for peace and respecting the lawful rights of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on this matter. During the meeting both Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's president Slobodan Milosevic have demanded distinct political and social requests on the matter. The planned meeting of peace talks requested by Bill Clinton, the president of the United States of America, took place on the date of 3-20 February 1999 in Rambouillet, France. President Milosevic has stated that the Kosovar-Albanians in the region have only the right to live under the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In addition to this statement he emphasized, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia only agrees upon partial autonomy. It has been said that the Serbian public has not appreciated the undergoing armed tensions between Kosovo liberation army and the government of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. On the other hand, The leader of Kosovo liberation army, Ibrahim Rugova demanded full independence in order to be able to be liberated from Yugoslav administration. Full-scale defence efforts of Kosovar-Albanians has been supported by Ibrahim Rugova, which led to turbulence during the meeting. Ibrahim Rugova has also complained about the security-crisis; such as living securely in the villages and towns which are predominantly Albanian. Within the region of Kosovo constitutional rights have been reported to have been violated. On the basis we conclude that the meeting was not as efficient as expected. The meeting concluded with the representative of Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and the president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) abandoning the meeting.

NATO, recognises the acts of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as a severe case of war crime and genocide, due to this reason NATO condemns the actions of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. NATO also recognises the Kosovo Liberation Army as an armed and national extremist terrorist group and believes that their actions are also a violation of the Geneva Convention and human rights . NATO is strongly against the actions which took place and led to many casualties among the civilian population.

NATO was conducting operational activities to ensure the withdrawal of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia when the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia launched an unexpected attack on the Kosovo Region. NATO not being prepared to handle an attack such as the attack that was made by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, led to NATO not being able to launch their operation on time and therefore NATO failed to establish the peace statement in the Kosovo Region that was aimed for. NATO observed and reflected upon their incorrect course of action regarding the matter and ensured the

world that a similar error in judgement and action will not be repeated. NATO gives their deepest apologies to the international committee for their lack of preparation.

Press Release

16 January 1999

NATO has been striving hard for finding concrete and suitable peace conditions for both parties. Unfortunately Yugoslavia leader Milosevic has not been contributing to peace and attempts for negotiations have failed. Web, As NATO the protectors of peace in Europe have agreed upon considering military action. NATO has continuously warned and condemned Yugoslavian genocidal actions against ethnic, unarmed kosovar Albanians. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has destroyed villages within the territory of the Kosovo region such as in Racak. The official police and military of the federal republic of Yugoslavia have killed both women and children. They committed tremendous war crimes which have been set in the Geneva Convention. Yugoslavia has also been openly racist towards Kosovar Albanians. Targeting the owner of the region. Yugoslav government's open hostility and racist is very similar to the fascist governments in 1940's. As NATO we feel the responsibility to eradicate fascism around the world. So in this path NATO had sent an ultimatum to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia openly said that Kosovo is a part of Serbia and Kosovar Albanians will have limited rights then serbs. Yugoslavia stated that Kosovar albinians will have less infrastructure like hospitals and schools. This violates many human rights violations. So NATO is considering to take military action against the Serbian government

North Atlantic Treaty Organization's Statement

COMMITTEE DIRECTIVE

NATO will conduct a military exercise of two; naval and land on November 1st-14th.

1. The land training will be conducted in South Macedonian Region 3200 armed personnel from each member state (200 each) will prepare for a close combat operation mainly aiming to fight against Guerilla Warfare and will take necessary education regarding the region and Serbian-Yugoslavian military dynamics.
2. Naval exercise will take part in South Edriatic for 7 days and North Aegean Sea for 7 days mainly focusing on cost deployment, carrier operations, strategic bombardments (ATG) and two cruisers, 1 carrier from the USA Navy and its entire fleet also containing 5 naval officers from each member state will conduct this training.
3. Two carriers from the Royal Navy and 1 destroyer and 3 coastal defense fleet from the Italian Navy. Containing its entire personnel will conduct this training.
4. F-4 Phantom II A10 War tugs will be provided by USA and Turkish airforces.
5. A group of European bombardment planes from NATO air bases will deploy to the Italian military airbases in South Sicily.
6. The bombardment planes will simulate potential carpet bombing in the mountain regions.
7. The land forces will be prepared for a mass and small-scale hostage extraction operations.
8. The planes will follow specific roads specified in the attached map
9. Every single prepared troop and member states will be prepared for a real large-scale military operation by NATO.
10. After the training camps are done, the prepared forces will stay active and in case of a needed move, they will make a move in 48 hours.



OPERATION “SURVEILLANCE”

Three cruisers from the Sixth Fleet of the United States Navy will be sent to the Imia/Kardak region to observe and analyse the ongoing tensions. The cruisers will escort the trade routes to ensure security until further notice. The cruisers will depart from the Sixth Fleet on the Second of January and are expected to arrive on the Fifth of January. The operation will begin immediately upon arrival. The three cruisers will be in contact with the Sixth Fleet and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation headquarters. If any intervention occurs, the cruisers will inform the fleet and NATO headquarters immediately.

1. The cruisers which are sent by the US Navy in the name of NATO have been sent to provide security and peace to de-escalate the tension which is between the Hellenic Republic and the Republic of Türkiye.
2. The cruisers are sent with the aim of observation and analysis. These cruisers are not heavily armed.
3. The US cruisers in the name of NATO will stay in the region until further notice.

4. If there is any threat regarding the Hellenic Republic or the Republic of Türkiye, the officers in the cruisers will be reporting the ongoing situation continuously.

OPERATION “KARDAK”

If the actions that are going to be taken are approved by the government of the United States of America, an operation under the name of “Operation Kardak” will be held. Operation Kardak will include the retreatment of two ships from the US Navy, which had previously been sent to the region. Two commanders, one from the Hellenic Republic and the other from the Republic of Türkiye, will be transported to the other cruiser, which will remain in the area by unarmed ships. A Turkish ship, identical to the existing ship by model, will be sent to the area for three days in order to ensure the safety and stabilisation of the region. The Hellenic and Turkish commanders will be unarmed. The warships from both states will retreat from the area at 6 AM, February, which will be the day the Operation Kardak begins. Turkish commandos on the islet will remain in the area for a month to further ensure the safety of the region.

1. Two of the previously sent three cruisers from the Sixth Fleet of the US Navy, in the name of NATO, will be withdrawn. The remaining cruiser in the region will continue its duty with two unarmed commanders from both respective nations.

2. The mentioned commanders will get on board by unarmed ships from their own navy forces.

3. The previously sent warships from the respective nations will start to withdraw from the region at 0600, 1st of February 1996.

4. A Turkish cruiser that is identical by model to the previously sent US cruisers will be sent to the region, which will be stationed for 3 days, in order to ensure security and stability in the region.

5. The Turkish commandos on the islets will remain in the region for the duration of a month.

6. The Turkish flag will stay without a time limit